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I. INTRODUCTION: A SHAKESPEAREAN REVERSAL OF THE
DISTRICT COURT
On June 20, 2011, Judge Jose Martinez of the Southern District of
Florida delivered his opinion on Paul Evans's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.1 Evans was sentenced to death in 1999 for the 1991 mur-
* Brendan E. Ryan, J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2008,
University of Notre Dame. This article is dedicated to my grandfather, Howard F. Ryan
(1907-1983), whose enduring legacy has inspired me to pursue a career in the law. I would also
like to thank my advisor, Professor Peter Nemerovski, for his guidance, as well as Allyson R. du
Lac, Death Penalty Law Clerk for the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, for introducing me to this fascinating case in the summer of 2012.
1. Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2011),
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der of Alan Pfeiffer in Indian River County, Florida. Having exhausted
his direct and collateral appeals in state court, Evans's last hope was
federal court, where he had made seventeen claims for relief. In his
order, Judge Martinez denied sixteen of Evans's claims, but granted
Evans's seventeenth claim, ruling that Florida's capital sentencing stat-
ute2 violates the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.3 In so doing,
Judge Martinez unleashed a tremor along a jurisprudential fault line that
has been threatening Florida's death penalty statute since the United
States Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Ring v.
Arizona.4
The reaction to the decision was predictable. Prosecutors protested,
claiming that the judge was "so far out on the limb, you can hear the
branch crack."5 Public defenders cheered, noting that Florida's "highly
convoluted" scheme for applying the death penalty "is squarely at odds
with Ring."6 Death penalty opponents rejoiced, believing that the deci-
sion would "likely spark a flurry of appeals from Death Row inmates."7
Right-wing bloggers bristled, decrying the "[j]udicial activism" that has
"left Paul Evans living comfortably in jail, and Alan Pfeiffer calling for
justice from the grave."8 Florida's Attorney General vowed to appeal the
ruling.9
An appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals came as prom-
ised, and the court published its ruling on October 23, 2012.10 In a unan-
imous opinion authored by Judge Edward Carnes, the court reversed the
district court's grant of Evans's habeas corpus petition. In offering
"Evans a spoonful of Shakespeare and a dash of Learned Hand,"' t Judge
rev'd sub noma. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11 th Cir. 2012), cert. denied
sub nor. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
2. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2010).
3. See Evans, 2011 WL 9717450, at *47-54.
4. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Court held that Arizona's capital sentencing statute, which
committed "both capital sentencing factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to
judges," was a violation of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee. Id. at 608 n.6.
5. Eliot James, State Attorney General to Appeal Ruling on Vero Beach Man's Death
Sentence, TCPALM.COM, June 23, 2011, http://www.tcpalm.com/news/201 l/jun/23/state-attorney-
general-to-appeal-ruling-on-vero/?print= 1.
6. Florida's Death Penalty Unconstitutional, A PUB. DEFENDER, June 22, 2011, http://a
publicdefender.com/2011/06/22/floridas-death-penalty-is-unconstitutional/.
7. Daphne Duret, Federal Judge Strikes Down Florida's Death Penalty, PALM BEACH POST,
June 22, 2011, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/state-regional/federal-judge-strikes-
down-floridas-death-penalty/nLtSN/.
8. Jesse Phillips, Justice Denied: Judge Overturns Florida Death Penalty, FLA. POL. PRESS,
June 27, 2011, http://www.floridapoliticalpress.com/2011/06/27/12768-12768.
9. See James, supra, note 5.
10. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub
nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
11. Robyn Hagan Cain, Is Florida's Capital Sentencing Statute Unconstitutional?,
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Carnes noted that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly instruct[ed] lower
courts that when one of its earlier decisions with direct application to a
case appears to rest on reasons rejected in a more recent line of deci-
sions, we must follow the directly applicable decision and leave to the
high Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. '"12 The more
recent line of cases that Judge Carnes referred to began with Ring, but he
remarked that a string of pre-Ring cases 13 specifically upheld "the advi-
sory jury verdict and judicial sentencing component of Florida's capital
punishment statute," and thus should be followed. 4 Therefore, with no
shortage of literary pizzazz, Judge Carnes set the stage for a Supreme
Court appeal.
On March 18, 2013, Evans filed his petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 5 Paul M. Smith, one of the country's leading appellate litigators,
signed the petition as Evans's counsel of record.' 6 Under Rule 15 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court, a brief in opposition to a petition for writ of
certiorari is mandatory in capital cases. 7 Florida filed its brief in opposi-
tion on April 18, 2013.18 An amici curiae brief in support of Evans was
also filed on April 18," 9 and Evans filed his reply brief shortly thereaf-
ter.20 However, on May 20, 2013, the Supreme Court denied Evans's
petition.2 ' Florida's capital sentencing statute had survived.
This Comment will discuss the Sixth Amendment concerns in Flor-
ida's capital sentencing statute that were at issue in Evans. The first Part
FINDLAW.COM, Oct. 24, 2012, http://blogs.findlaw.com/eleventhcircuit/2012/10/is-floridas-
capital-sentencing-statute-unconstitutional.html.
12. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1252.
13. See, e.g., Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
14. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1256.
15. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., No. 12-1134
(Mar. 18, 2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiorari-Evans.pdf.
16. See id. Paul M. Smith, partner at Jenner & Block LLP in Washington D.C., has argued
fourteen Supreme Court cases, most notably on behalf of the petitioners in Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), a landmark gay rights decision that invalidated Texas's sodomy statute. JENNER
& BLOCK: APPELLATE AND SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, http://jenner.com/practices/100 (last
visited Mar. 29, 2013).
17. SuP. CT. R. 15.
18. See Brief of Respondent Michael D. Crews, Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs. in Opposition,
Evans, No. 12-1134 (Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.comwp-content/
uploads/2013/05/evansBlOfinal.pdf.
19. See Brief of Amici Curiae for the Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers et al. in Support of
Petitioner, Evans, No. 12-1134 (Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Evans.pdf.
20. See Reply Brief of Petitioner Paul H. Evans, Evans, No. 12-1134 (Apr. 29, 2013),
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/12-1134-Evans-Reply-
Brief.pdf.
21. See Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
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of the Comment will review the jurisprudential background of Florida's
death penalty scheme. This Part will discuss the development of the
modem Florida capital punishment statute, important pre-Ring Supreme
Court decisions that validated its constitutional legitimacy, the impact of
several non-death penalty Supreme Court decisions in the lead up to
Ring, Ring itself, and Florida's response to Ring. The second Part
explores the facts, the procedural history, and the district court and Elev-
enth Circuit decisions in Evans. The third Part discusses the legal analy-
sis of the district court and the Eleventh Circuit decisions in Evans, and
explains why this issue needs to be addressed by the Supreme Court.
The fourth Part examines how effectively the facts in Evans elucidated
the Sixth Amendment questions at issue to determine whether the
Supreme Court missed a golden opportunity when it denied certiorari.
The Fifth Part considers proactive steps that Florida can take to ensure
that its capital sentencing procedures are constitutional under Ring.
Finally, the sixth Part concludes that proactive reform may help save the
death penalty in Florida, not usher in its demise.
II. JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND TO FLORIDA'S DEATH
PENALTY STATUTE
A. The Post-Furman Florida Statute
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,22 the United States Supreme Court
struck down all of the existing death-penalty statutes in the various
states. By a 5-4 majority, the badly fragmented Court overturned the
death sentences for two defendants convicted of rape and one defendant
convicted of murder. 23 Three of the Justices in the majority (Justices
Stewart, White, and Douglas)2 4 held that giving the sentencer (either
judge or jury) "untrammeled discretion" 25 to determine wheth-
er the death penalty should be imposed violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment. 26 For
these Justices, it was not the death penalty itself that was cruel and un-
usual; rather, it was the sentencing procedures in the several states that
was cruel and unusual because they promoted the arbitrary applica-
tion of the death penalty. 27 Two of the Justices (Justices Brennan
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23. Id. at 239-40.
24. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 310 (White,
J., concurring).
25. Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., concurring).
26. U.S. CONST., AMEND. VIn.
27. For his part, Justice Potter Stewart concluded that the death sentences in question were
"cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Furman,
408 U.S. at 309. He continued:
[Vol. 67:933
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and Marshall) 28 concurred on the grounds that all capital punishment is
cruel and unusual in light of the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. '2 9 All nine Justices filed sepa-
rate opinions in support of their positions.3° As a result of the Court's
decision in Furman, more than 600 prisoners who had been sentenced to
death between 1967 and 1972 had their death sentences lifted.3"
Given no clear guidance from the Court, the states began to reenact
death penalty statutes based upon their interpretations of the various
opinions in Furman. A total of thirty-eight states reinstituted capital
punishment in the years following Furman." Florida became the first
state to reenact the death penalty after Furman on December 8, 1972,11
and Florida's statute served as a template for some other states in devel-
oping their own capital punishment procedures.34 Florida's capital sen-
tencing procedure first requires that a jury unanimously convict a
defendant of first-degree murder.3 Then it provides for a three-step pro-
For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. My concurring
Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of
these few to be sentenced to death, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of
race. But racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side. I simply
conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction
of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
Id. at 309-10.
28. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 327 (Marshall, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 239-40.
31. Recent Legal History of the Death Penalty in America: American Capital Punishment
Goes to Court, ABOUT.COM, http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/bldeathpenalty.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2013).
32. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002). As of May, 2 2013, only thirty-two
states still had the death penalty. On that date, Maryland became the sixth state in the last six years
to repeal the death penalty, joining Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, and
Illinois. Ian Simpson, Maryland Becomes Latest U.S. State to Abolish Death Penalty,
REUTERS.COM, May 2, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-usa-maryland-death
penalty-idUSBRE9410TQ20130502. On November 6, 2012, voters in California rejected
Proposition 34, a ballot measure that would have repealed the death penalty. Anna Almendrala,
Prop 34 Defeated: California Voters Preserve Death Penalty, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 7,
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/prop-34-defeated-califomia_n_2089011 .html.
33. See Ken Driggs, A Current of Electricity Sufficient in Intensity to Cause Immediate
Death: A Pre-Furman History of Florida's Electric Chair, 22 STETSON L. REV. 1169, 1207
(1993).
34. Today, only Alabama uses similar capital punishment sentencing procedures. See ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-45 (2012). Indiana used to have a similar procedure, but it changed its death
penalty statute in 2002. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2007). Delaware modeled a new capital
punishment statute after Florida's statute in 1991, but made fundamental changes to it after the
Supreme Court's decision in Ring in 2002. See Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., The Delaware Death
Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97 IowA L. REV. 1925, 1931-32 (2012).
35. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.440.
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cess to determine the appropriate sentence: an advisory verdict from the
jury, a Spencer hearing, and the trial judge's sentencing order.
1. STEP ONE: THE JURY'S ADVISORY VERDICT
The first step is a separate sentencing proceeding before the trial
judge and jury "to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced
to death or to life imprisonment. '3 6 During the proceeding, the jury
hears evidence to establish statutory aggravating factors 37 and statu-
tory38 or nonstatutory3 9 mitigating factors. Aggravating circumstances
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; a fact-finder must only
be "reasonably convinced" that a mitigating circumstance exists in order
to consider it established.40
After hearing the evidence, the jury deliberates before making its
sentencing recommendation. First the jury must determine if one or
more aggravating circumstances have been established beyond a reason-
able doubt.4 ' If the jury finds that no aggravating circumstances were
established, or that the aggravating circumstances alone do not justify
the imposition of a death sentence, then the jury is instructed to recom-
mend a sentence of life imprisonment 2.4  Next, the jury must determine if
"sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances found to exist."4 Last, each juror weighs the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors to decide whether to recommend a death
sentence or a life sentence. 44 A simple majority of the jury voting for
death is necessary for a recommendation of the death penalty. 5
36. Id.
37. As of 2012, there were sixteen statutory aggravating factors in Florida. FLA. STAT.
§ 921.141(5)(a)-(p) (2010).
38. As of 2012, there were seven statutory mitigating factors in Florida. FLA. STAT.
§ 921.141(6)(a)-(g).
39. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(h). In 1978, the United States Supreme Court held that a
sentencing court must consider all mitigating circumstances, not just those listed in a particular
state statute. "The limited range of mitigating circumstances which may be considered by the
sentencer under the Ohio statute is incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. To
meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of
relevant mitigating factors." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
40. See Stand. Jury Instrs. in Crim. Cases - NO. 96-1, 690 So. 2d 1263, 1267-68 (Fla. 1997).
41. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(a).
42. Stand. Jury Instrs. in Crim. Cases, 690 So. 2d at 1267-68.
43. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(b).
44. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c).
45. Only Florida and Delaware allow a jury to recommend the death penalty by a simple
majority. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2012). Delaware requires a
unanimous jury finding of at least one aggravating factor in order for the judge to ultimately
sentence the defendant to death. See Sheri Johnson et al., The Delaware Death Penalty: An
Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REv. 1925, 1931 (2012). Alabama requires a super-majority (ten or
more jurors) to recommend the death penalty. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (2012).
[Vol. 67:933
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To understand Ring's application to Florida's sentencing scheme, it
is important to understand what this jury recommendation is and what
this jury recommendation is not. The jury recommendation does not
make a detailed factual finding on what aggravating factors exist beyond
a reasonable doubt,46 nor does it make a detailed factual finding on what
mitigating factors exist with reasonable certainty.47 The jury recommen-
dation reflects only the number of jurors voting for the imposition of the
death penalty after each juror balances the aggravating and mitigating
factors that each juror found to exist.
2. STEP Two: THE SPENCER HEARING
After the jury delivers its sentencing recommendation, the judge
holds a Spencer hearing." During the Spencer hearing, the judge must
do the following:
a) give the defendant, his counsel, and the State, an opportunity to be
heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the State and the defendant an
opportunity to present additional evidence; c) allow both sides to
comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical
report; and d) afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in
person.49
Equipped with the jury's advisory verdict and the information gleaned
from the Spencer proceeding, "the trial judge should then recess the pro-
ceeding to consider the appropriate sentence."5 °
3. STEP THREE: JUDGE'S SENTENCING ORDER
When the judge has determined the appropriate sentence, he or she
"set[s] a hearing to impose the sentence and contemporaneously file[s]
the sentencing order."5 During his or her deliberations, the judge must
give the jury's advisory verdict "great weight. '52 The judge may over-
ride a jury's recommendation of a life sentence only if "the facts sug-
gesting a sentence of death" are "so clear and convincing that virtually
no reasonable person could differ."5 3 If the judge imposes the death pen-
46. Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 54 (Fla. 2003).
47. Id.
48. See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
49. Id. at 691.
50. Id.
51. Id. Note that this hearing is separate from the Spencer hearing. See id.
52. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
53. Id. The last time the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a trial judge's decision to override a
jury recommendation of a life sentence was in 1998. See Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So. 2d 488 (Fla.
1998). In that case, the jury recommended death for the defendant's murder of his wife and seven-
year-old son, but recommended life for the murder of his five-year-old daughter. Id. at 490-91.
The trial judge overrode the life sentence recommendation for the murder of the daughter. Id. The
2013]
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alty, he or she must deliver a thorough sentencing order detailing the
amount of weight that he or she assigned to each aggravating and miti-
gating factor supported by the evidence. 4 The judge may only consider
aggravating and mitigating factors supported by "sufficient competent
evidence in the record."55 The Florida Supreme Court automatically
reviews all death sentences. 6
B. The Supreme Court Validates the Florida Statute
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to evaluate Florida's newly
developed capital punishment procedures came in 1976 with Proffitt v.
Florida.5 7 The Court held that Florida's capital punishment statute effec-
tively addresses Furman's arbitrariness concerns under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and thus "passes constitutional muster."58
Proffitt did not present a Sixth Amendment claim for a right to a jury
trial. However, the Court did consider Florida's procedures and the right
to a jury trial in two later cases: Spaziano v. Florida59 and Hildwin v.
Florida.6 °
1. SPAZIANO V. FLORIDA
In Spaziano, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder
after a trial in which the prosecution's primary witness "testified that
petitioner had taken him to a garbage dump in Seminole County, Fla.,
where petitioner had pointed out the remains of two women he claimed
to have tortured and murdered."'6' During the sentencing phase of the
proceeding, the jury recommended life imprisonment. 62 Finding two
aggravating circumstances, 63 the trial judge concluded that "notwith-
standing the recommendation of the jury, . . sufficient aggravating cir-
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the override, noting that the "facts suggesting the sentence of
death for all three of these murders are clear and convincing, and as to Ana [the daughter], even
more compelling." Id. at 494. Before Zakrzewski, the last time the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed a trial judge's decision to override a jury recommendation of a life sentence was in 1994.
See Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1994).
54. See Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990) ("The court next must weigh the
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating and, in order to facilitate appellate review, must
expressly consider in its written order each established mitigating circumstance. Although the
relative weight given each mitigating factor is within the province of the sentencing court, a
mitigating factor once found cannot be dismissed as having no weight.").
55. Brown v. Wainright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981).
56. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (2010).
57. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
58. Id. at 259.
59. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
60. 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 450.
62. Id. at 451.
63. Id. ("The two aggravating circumstances found by the court were that the homicide was
[Vol. 67:933
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cumstances existed to justify and authorize a death sentence[;] ...the
mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh such aggravating
circumstances and ... a sentence of death should be imposed in this
case."'  The defendant contended that allowing a judge to override a
jury's advisory verdict for life imprisonment violates the defendant's
constitutional right to a jury trial.6" The defendant's "fundamental pre-
mise," however, was "that the capital sentencing decision is one that, in
all cases, should be made by a jury."66
The Court rejected the defendant's claim for two reasons. First, the
Court noted that Florida's capital sentencing proceeding is like a regular
trial in that the "embarrassment, expense, and ordeal ...faced by a
defendant ...are at least equivalent."67 Thus, the Double Jeopardy
Clause "bars the State from making repeated efforts to persuade a sen-
tencer to impose the death penalty" because of "the risk that the State,
with all its resources, would wear a defendant down, thereby leading to
an erroneously imposed death penalty."68 But, the Court continued, there
is no danger of erroneously imposing the death penalty when the defen-
dant is denied a jury trial during capital sentencing.69 "The sentencer,
whether judge or jury, has a constitutional obligation to evaluate the
unique circumstances of the individual defendant and the sentencer's
decision for life is final."7 Thus, the Court concluded that Florida's cap-
ital sentencing proceeding is not "like a trial in respects significant to the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial."71
Second, the Court observed that the Sixth Amendment has never
been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination on an individ-
ual's sentence.72 "[A] capital sentencing proceeding," the Court said,
"involves the same fundamental issues involved in any other sentencing
proceeding-a determination of the appropriate punishment to be
imposed on an individual."73 Although the stakes are higher in a capital
sentencing proceeding, the Court could find no principled reason for
why this would implicate the defendant's constitutional right to a jury
especially heinous and atrocious and that the defendant had been convicted previously of felonies
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.").
64. Id.
65. Id. at 457.
66. Id. at 458.
67. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
68. Id. at 458-59.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 459.
73. Id.
2013]
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trial. 74 Thus, the Court concluded that a judge's imposition of a death
sentence, despite a jury's recommendation of a life sentence, does not
violate the Sixth Amendment.75
2. HILDWIN V. FLORIDA
In Hildwin, the defendant was convicted of raping and strangling a
woman in Hernando County, Florida. 76 During the sentencing proceed-
ings, the jury unanimously recommended death.77 In affirming the jury's
recommendation, the trial judge found four aggravating circumstances:
"petitioner had previous convictions for violent felonies, he was under a
sentence of imprisonment at the time of the murder, the killing was com-
mitted for pecuniary gain, and the killing was especially heinous, atro-
cious, and cruel."'7' The defendant contended that Florida's procedures
violated the Sixth Amendment because they permitted "the imposition
of death without a specific finding by the jury that sufficient aggravating
circumstances exist to qualify the defendant for capital punishment.
79
In rejecting the defendant's claim, the Court cited McMillan v.
Pennsylvania."° In that case, the Court upheld a statute that required a
mandatory minimum sentence if the sentencing judge found by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a fire-
arm. '" The McMillan Court noted that the statute "neither alters the
maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense
calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing
court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already availa-
ble to it.' '8 2 This, the Court reasoned, made possession of a firearm a
74. See id.
75. See id. at 462-463.
76. Inmate Paul Hildwin, COMM'N ON CAP. CASES, http://www.floridacapitalcases.state.fl.us/
imnate-details.cfm?id=185 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). In 2003, DNA test results proved that the
semen and saliva found at the crime scene did not belong to Hildwin. DNA Database Search
Could Free Man on Florida's Death Row; Legal Papers Filed to Force State to Allow Search for
Real Perpetrator in 1986 Murder Case, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/Content/DNADatabaseSearchCould_FreeMan_on_Floridas_Death_RowLegalPapers_
FiledtoForceStatetoAllow_Search-for..RealPerpetrator in_1986_Murder.Case.php (last
visited Feb. 11, 2013). In 2011, the DNA was matched to the victim's boyfriend, William
Haverty, about whom investigators had had early suspicions. Tony Holt, Attorney Fighting to
Overturn Death Sentence in 1985 Murder, HERNANDOTODAY.COM, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www2.
hernandotoday.con/news/hemando-news/2012/aug/08/hanewso 1-attomey-fighting-to-overturn-
death-sente-ar-456967/. As of August, 2012, Hildwin remained in prison. See id.
77. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 639.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
81. Id. at 81.
82. Id. at 87-88.
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"sentencing factor," not an element of the offense.83 Because the exis-
tence of an aggravating circumstance during capital sentencing is also a
sentencing factor, the Hildwin Court concluded that "the Sixth Amend-
ment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposi-
tion of the sentence of death be made by the jury. 84
Under the holdings in Spaziano and Hildwin, the Supreme Court
made clear that a jury need not determine (a) whether a defendant should
be sentenced to death, or (b) whether any aggravating factors exist such
that the defendant is eligible to be sentenced to death. In Walton v. Ari-
zona,8 5 the Supreme Court explicitly upheld a capital sentencing system
in which the trial judge presides over the penalty phase without any
input from a jury.8 6 The Court deliberately cited Spaziano and
Hildwin,87 making the same distinction between sentencing factors and
elements of the offense that was found in McMillan.88 Over the next
decade, however, a surprise attack on this foundational distinction would
begin to emerge in several non-death-penalty cases, culminating in the
seminal case of Apprendi v. New Jersey.89
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey
After Walton, the Court spent considerable time trying to differenti-
ate between a sentencing factor (requiring no jury determination) and an
element of the offense (requiring a jury determination). In Almendarez-
Torres v. United States,9" for example, the defendant challenged a stat-
ute that allowed for an enhanced sentence to be imposed by a judge due
to a prior deportation.91 The Court held that a defendant's prior record is
a sentencing factor, and not an element of the offense.92 On the other
hand, in Jones v. United States,93 the Court dealt with a federal carjack-
ing statute that provided for separate maximum penalties depending on
whether serious bodily injury or death occurred.94 The Court held that
the statute created three different offenses, the elements of which must
83. Id. at 86.
84. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41.
85. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
86. Id. at 643-49.
87. Id. at 647-48.
88. Id. at 648.
89. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
90. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
91. Id. at 226-27.
92. Id. at 235.
93. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
94. Id. at 230 (The three penalties were as follows: (1) if at the time of the crime, the person
was in possession of a firearm, the penalty was not more than fifteen years; (2) if serious bodily
injury resulted, the penalty was not more than twenty-five years; and (3) if death resulted, the
penalty was any number of years up to life.).
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be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 95 The primary difference
between the two cases, the Court reasoned, was that a "prior conviction
must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair
notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. 96 The elements in
the carjacking statute did not share this characteristic.97
While Almendarez-Torres and Jones represented opposite ends of
the sentencing-factors/elements-of-the-offense dichotomy, the statute in
Apprendi seemed to fall somewhere in the middle. In New Jersey, pos-
session of a firearm for an unlawful purpose is a second-degree offense,
carrying a sentence range of five to ten years.98 However, New Jersey
law also provided for "an 'extended term' of imprisonment if the trial
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that '[t]he defendant in
committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or
group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity."' 99 This extended term of imprisonment
for a "hate crime" changed the sentencing range for a second-degree
offense to ten to twenty years.100
In Apprendi, the defendant admitted to firing "several .22-caliber
bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently
moved into [his] previously all-white neighborhood."'' The defendant
entered into a plea bargain, but "reserved the right to challenge the hate
crime sentence enhancement on the ground that it violate[d] the United
States Constitution."' 1 2 At sentencing, the trial judge held an evidentiary
hearing to determine the defendant's motive for the crime."13 After the
hearing, the trial judge concluded "that the crime was motivated by
racial bias" and that the "hate crime enhancement applied."104 The judge
then sentenced the defendant to a twelve-year prison term, two years
more than the maximum sentence allowed without the hate crime
enhancement. 105
Apprendi appealed, arguing that the Sixth Amendment, as applied
to the states by the. Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
95. Jones, 526 U.S. at 252.
96. Id. at 249.
97. Id.
98. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-4(a),
2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
99. Id. at 468-69 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995), invalidated by Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).
100. Id. at 469.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 470.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 471.
105. Id.
[Vol. 67:933
THE EVANS CASE
"requires that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence
was based ... be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' 10 6 The
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld the stat-
ute, and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. °7 In a 5-4 decision,
the United States Supreme Court reversed.'0 8
The Apprendi decision threatened many states' death penalty stat-
utes because it put an end to the distinction between sentencing factors
and elements of the offense. First, the Court observed that "[a]ny possi-
ble distinction between an 'element' of a felony offense and a 'sentenc-
ing factor' was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by
jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding
our Nation's founding."'0 9 The Court also noted that Almendarez-Torres
"represents at best an exceptional departure" from the historical rule
enunciated in Jones because of the "procedural safeguards attached to
any 'fact' of [a] prior conviction."1 "0 The Court then reconciled
Almendarez-Torres and Jones, holding that "[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."" Finally, the Court concluded that
"[t]he New Jersey procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable
departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our
criminal justice system.""' 2
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas questioned Walton's
continued validity in the context of Arizona's judge-only capital sen-
tencing statute because of its distinction between sentencing factors and
elements of the offense.1 13 That issue came to a head the following year
in Ring v. Arizona."14
D. The Court Goes to "Apprendi-Land" in Ring v. Arizona
In 2003, Chief Justice Harry Anstead of the Florida Supreme Court
called Ring the "most significant death penalty decision from the U.S.
Supreme Court in the past thirty years."'1 5 In an opinion by Justice
Ginsburg, the Court struck down Arizona's judge-only capital sentenc-
106. Id.
107. Id. at 471-72.
108. Id. at 474.
109. Id. at 478.
110. Id. at 487-88.
111. Id. at 490.
112. Id. at 497.
113. Id. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
115. Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 57 (Fla. 2003) (Anstead, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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ing procedure (and overruled its holding in Walton) because it was
"irreconcilable" with the Court's holding in Apprendi.116 While Ring did
not explicitly strike down Florida's "hybrid system[ ],,,117 the decision
did call it into question.
1. RING V. ARIZONA
In Ring, the defendant and two others robbed an armored van in
Glendale, Arizona.118 During the robbery, one of the vehicle's drivers
was killed. 119 At Ring's trial, the jury "deadlocked on premeditated mur-
der, . .. but convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of
armed robbery."12 The evidence at trial failed to prove that Ring "was a
major participant in the armed robbery or that he actually murdered [the
victim]." '21 However, after Ring's trial but before his sentencing hear-
ing, one of his co-defendants accepted a plea bargain and agreed to
cooperate in Ring's prosecution. 22 During the sentencing hearing, the
co-defendant testified that Ring was the leader of the group and actually
killed the victim. 12 3 The trial judge, without any input from a jury, sen-
tenced Ring to death. 124
Under Arizona's capital sentencing statute, Ring could not be sen-
tenced to death unless further findings were made. 125 After a jury con-
victed a defendant of first-degree murder, the statute required the trial
judge to conduct, without a jury, "a separate sentencing hearing to deter-
mine the existence or nonexistence of [certain enumerated] circum-
stances. ' 126 At the hearing's conclusion, the judge made the factual
determinations on the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 127 The judge was "to sentence the defendant to death
only if there were at least one aggravating circumstance and there [were]
no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leni-
ency." 12 8 Under this procedure, the finding of an aggravating circum-
stance was what triggered the potential of the death penalty. 129 Thus,
116. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
117. Id. at 608 n.6.
118. Id. at 589.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 591.
121. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Ariz. 2001).
122. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 593 (2002).
123. Id. at 593-94.
124. Id. at 594.
125. Id. at 592.
126. Id. (citing ARIZ. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (2000), invalidated by Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
127. Id.
128. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
129. See id. at 597.
[Vol. 67:933
THE EVANS CASE
under Apprendi's logic, an offense punishable by death had, as an ele-
ment, the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance.1 30 "The
question presented," the Court said, was "whether that aggravating fac-
tor may be found by the judge ... or whether the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial guarantee, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, require[d] that the aggravating factor determination be
entrusted to the jury." '131
In finding the Arizona procedure unconstitutional under Apprendi,
the Court noted that the Arizona procedure was upheld in Walton
because of the now-extinct distinction between sentencing factors and
elements of the offense. 32 Apprendi, Justice Ginsburg said, made the
question "one not of form, but of effect. If a State makes an increase in a
defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact,
that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 133 Thus, the Court concluded that it must
"overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting
without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for impo-
sition of the death penalty."1 34
2. JUSTICE SCALIA TRAVELS TO APPRENDI-LAND
Despite joining the majority, Justice Scalia filed a concurrence
(joined by Justice Thomas) that is, without a doubt, Ring's most memo-
rable opinion.1 35 With the kind of gusto that only he can manufacture,
Justice Scalia considered the Court's Sixth Amendment and Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence before concluding that Arizona's judge-only
death penalty scheme violated the jury trial guarantee. 13 6
Ring confronted Justice Scalia "with a difficult choice."' 37 On the
one hand, Justice Scalia wanted to overrule the Court's decision in
Furman.138 Because Furman was the reason that Arizona had to create a
new death-penalty statute that specified particular aggravating factors
that must be found in order for the death penalty to be imposed, Justice
Scalia was "reluctant to magnify the burdens that our Furman jurispru-
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 598.
133. Id. at 602 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
134. Id. at 609.
135. Id. at 610-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 610.
138. Id. Justice Scalia cited with approval then-Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in
Gardner v. Florida, which reasoned that "the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment relates to the
character of the punishment, and not to the process by which it is imposed." Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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dence imposes on the States."'13 9 On the other hand, Justice Scalia also
believed that
the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls
them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-
must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.1 40
Faced with such a "quandary," Justice Scalia admitted that at the time
Walton was decided, he "still would have approved the Arizona
scheme," favoring "the States' freedom to develop their own capital sen-
tencing procedures (already erroneously abridged by Furman) over the
logic of the Apprendi principle." '' Since Walton, however, Justice
Scalia noted that he had "acquired new wisdom" that caused him to
reach the opposite conclusion in Ring.142
Justice Scalia's newfound wisdom in Ring "consist[ed] of two real-
izations." '143 First, he recognized "that it is impossible to identify with
certainty those aggravating factors whose adoption has been wrongfully
coerced by Furman, as opposed to those that the State would have
adopted in any event."'" Second, his observations since Walton caused
him to believe that
our people's traditional belief in the right of trial by jury is in perilous
decline. That decline is bound to be confirmed, and indeed acceler-
ated, by the repeated spectacle of a man's going to his death because
a judge found that an aggravating factor existed. We cannot preserve
our veneration for the protection of the jury in criminal cases if we
render ourselves callous to the need for that protection by regularly
imposing the death penalty without it.'45
As a result, Justice Scalia concluded that "whether or not the States have
been erroneously coerced into the adoption of 'aggravating factors,'
wherever those factors exist.., they must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt."
' 146
Finally, Justice Scalia clarified the Court's holding while simulta-
neously addressing Justice Breyer's cumbersome concurrence. Justice
Breyer, who dissented in Apprendi,47 nonetheless concurred in Ring
because he believed that "jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated by
139. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 610-11.
142. Id. at 611.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 612.
146. Id.
147. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the Eighth Amendment."' 48 Justice Scalia first noted that "today's judg-
ment has nothing to do with jury sentencing. What today's decision says
is that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating
factor existed."' 49 He then identified two ways in which the "ultimate
life-or-death decision '  can be left to a judge without violating the
Sixth Amendment: (1) by requiring that the jury find an aggravating
factor during a separate sentencing phase or (2) "by placing the aggra-
vating-factor determination (where it logically belongs anyway) in the
guilt phase."15 Justice Scalia concluded his concurrence by playfully
urging Justice Breyer to accept Apprendi: "There is really no way in
which Justice Breyer can travel with the happy band that reaches today's
result unless he says yes to Apprendi. Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on
the wrong flight; he should either get off before the doors close, or buy a
ticket to Apprendi-land."152
3. EXPLICIT REFERENCES TO THE FLORIDA STATUTE IN RING
In striking down Arizona's judge-only capital sentencing statute,
the Court mentioned Florida's capital sentencing statute on two occa-
sions. First, the Court discussed Florida's procedures during the sum-
mary of its decision in Walton.'53 Second, the Court called Florida's
sentencing scheme a "hybrid" system in footnote six of the majority
opinion. 15 The context of both references to the Florida death-penalty
statute is helpful in determining what effect Ring has on the constitution-
ality of the Florida statute.
In Walton, the Court said the following about Florida's death sen-
tencing procedures:
It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a sentence, but it does
not make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mit-
igating or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation is not
binding on the trial judge. A Florida trial court no more has the assis-
tance of a jury's findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues
than does a trial judge in Arizona. 155
In Ring, which overruled Walton, the Court said the following about
Florida's capital sentencing procedures and the Hildwin decision:
In Walton v. Arizona, we upheld Arizona's scheme against a charge
148. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 612-13.
152. Id. at 613.
153. Id. at 598 (majority opinion).
154. Id. at 608 n.6.
155. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990).
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that it violated the Sixth Amendment. The Court had previously
denied a Sixth Amendment challenge to Florida's capital sentencing
system, in which the jury recommends a sentence but makes no
explicit findings on aggravating circumstances; we so ruled, Walton
noted, on the ground that "the Sixth Amendment does not require that
the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of
death be made by the jury." Walton found unavailing the attempts by
the defendant-petitioner in that case to distinguish Florida's capital
sentencing system from Arizona's. In neither State, according to Wal-
ton, were the aggravating factors "elements of the offense"; in both
States, they ranked as "sentencing considerations" guiding the choice
between life and death. 156
Given that (a) Apprendi marked the end of the differentiation between
sentencing considerations and elements of the offense and (b) Ring over-
ruled Walton, the previous passage could be read to suggest that Ring
overrules Hildwin and makes Florida's death penalty scheme
unconstitutional.
However, while the summary of Walton in Ring might imply that
Florida's procedure is an unconstitutional violation of the jury trial guar-
antee, footnote six of the majority opinion might cut in the opposite
direction. Footnote six says that of the thirty-eight states that had capital
punishment in 2002, twenty-nine "commit sentencing decisions to
juries," five "commit both capital sentencing factfinding and the ulti-
mate sentencing decision entirely to judges," and four "have hybrid sys-
tems, in which the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes
the ultimate sentencing determinations." '157 Arizona's system in 2002 fit
into the second category, while Florida's system today fits into the third
"hybrid" category. 158 Ring explicitly strikes down the death penalty stat-
utes in the second category, 159 speaks favorably about the statutes in the
first category, 160 and says nothing about the statutes in the hybrid cate-
gory. By separating the hybrid category from the other two categories,
the Court may have implicitly approved Florida's statute. At the very
least, this separation indicates that the Court left the issue of the consti-
tutionality of Florida's procedures for another day.
156. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 598 (2002) (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam))) (internal citations omitted).
157. Id. at 608 n.6.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 608.
160. Id. ("Unlike Arizona, the great majority of States responded to this Court's Eighth
Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by
entrusting those determinations to the jury.").
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E. The Florida Supreme Court Reacts to Ring
On March 18, 1976, Amos Lee King brutally murdered Natalie
Brady in Tarpon Springs, Florida. 161 He was sentenced to death in
1977.162 Linroy Bottoson was convicted of the 1979 murder of Cathe-
rine Alexander in Eatonville, Florida. 163 He was sentenced to death in
1981.164 On October 24, 2002, their cases became inextricably linked
when the Florida Supreme Court denied their petitions for habeas corpus
relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's newly-minted deci-
sion in Ring v. Arizona.165 After the Court declined to intervene, 166 Bot-
toson was executed on December 9, 2002,167 and King was executed on
February 26, 2003.168
The Bottoson and King cases first became linked when the United
States Supreme Court stayed their executions in early 2002.169 The stays
were accompanied by statements that said "that the stays would termi-
nate automatically if certiorari was not granted."'170 On June 28, 2002,
after the Court had issued its decision in Ring, it denied certiorari in both
King and Bottoson.17' This automatically lifted the stays of execution,
but the Florida Supreme Court issued new stays on July 8, 2002 so the
inmates could make new Sixth Amendment arguments in light of
Ring. 7 2 Although the denial of relief was unanimous in both cases, the
seven Florida justices issued a total of eight different opinions.'73
Both cases included short per curiam opinions that are almost
entirely identical.'74 These opinions noted that "the United States
Supreme Court repeatedly has reviewed and upheld Florida's capital
sentencing statute.., and although Bottoson contends that there now are
areas of 'irreconcilable conflict' in that precedent, the Court in Ring did
161. King v. State, 390 So. 2d 315, 316-17 (Fla. 1980).
162. King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143, 147-48 (Fla. 2002) (Wells, J., concurring specially).
163. Bottoson v. State, 443 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1983).
164. Bottoson v. Singletary, 685 So. 2d 1302, 1303 (Fla. 1997).
165. See generally Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d
143 (Fla. 2002).
166. Bottoson v. Moore, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002); King v. Moore, 537 U.S. 1067 (2002).
167. Linroy Bottoson, CLARKPROSECUTOR.ORG, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/
bottoson8l3.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
168. Amos Lee King, Jr., CLARKPROSECUTOR.ORG, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/
US/king834.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
169. See Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 697 (Wells, J., concurring specially).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 696.
173. Id. at 695; King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143, 145 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
174. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam). See also King,
831 So. 2d at 144-45.
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not address this issue."' 1 71 Thus, because Ring did not address Florida's
capital sentencing statute, the statute remains constitutional until the
Supreme Court determines otherwise. 176 In so holding, the court cited
the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amer-
ican Express, 17 7 which held that "[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the [other courts] should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions."'' 78 Implicit in this quote, however, was the unequivocal
acknowledgement that the constitutionality of the Florida statute rests on
reasons that were rejected in Ring. The litany of concurring opinions that
followed drove this point home. 179
The various concurring opinions in Bottoson and King elucidated
two important points. First, Justices Shaw and Pariente concurred specif-
ically because both inmates had committed violent felonies prior to com-
mitting first-degree murder. 8° As discussed above, Almendarez-Torres
held that sentence enhancements due to prior felony convictions do not
require a jury determination.1 8' Apprendi affirmed this principle when it
made its jury determination requirement mandatory for all facts leading
to sentence enhancements "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction."' 82
Thus, Justices Shaw and Pariente concluded that even if the inmates had
valid claims under Ring for their other aggravating factors, at least one
aggravating factor would remain to make them death-eligible.' 83
Second, Justice Shaw disagreed with the conclusion "that the
United States Supreme Court's decision denying certiorari and lifting
the stay of execution ... constitutes either a validation of Florida's capi-
tal sentencing statute or an approval of Bottoson's execution."' 84 In
Teague v. Lane, 85 the Court held that "new rules [of law] generally
175. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695.
176. Id.
177. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
178. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695 (Fla. 2002) (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484).
179. See, e.g., id. at 703-10 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only); id. at 710-19 (Shaw, J.,
concurring in result only); id. at 719-25 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only).
180. Id. at 718-19 (Shaw, J., concurring in result only); id. at 722 (Pariente, J., concurring in
result only); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143, 148-49 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in result
only); id. at 149 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only).
181. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
182. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
183. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 718-19 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in result
only); id. at 722 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only); King, 831 So. 2d at 148-49 (Shaw, J.,
concurring in result only); id. at 149 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only).
184. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 710 (Shaw, J., concurring in result only).
185. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review." '86
Only cases on direct review receive retroactive application of new
Supreme Court holdings in federal court.'87 Thus, because both Bottoson
and King were on collateral review when the Court denied certiorari, the
Court could not apply its decision in Ring to those cases.' 88 This helps
explain why there had been no serious post-Ring challenges to Florida's
death penalty statute in federal court before Evans.t89
III. THE EVANS CASE
A. Facts
The Evans case involved the 1991 murder-for-hire of Alan Pfeiffer
in Vero Beach, Florida. 190 There were four coconspirators in Alan's
murder: Paul Evans; Connie Pfeiffer, the wife of the victim; Sarah
Thomas, Evans's girlfriend; and Donna Waddell, Evans's and Thomas's
roommate. 91 Thomas and Waddell, who both testified for the State, pro-
vided most of the testimony about the events surrounding the murder.1 92
Waddell agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for
her testimony. 193 Thomas was not charged with any crime.194 Connie
Pfeiffer, who did not testify at Evans's trial, was convicted of first-
degree murder and received a life sentence. 95
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Connie and Alan had a
"rocky" marriage, and that each was dating other people while they were
married.' 96 Motivated by the prospect of collecting on her husband's life
186. Id. at 305.
187. See id. at 301-10.
188. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 710 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in result
only).
189. Just prior to Evans, there were two Sixth Amendment challenges in Florida federal courts
to Florida's death penalty statute that were not denied because of the retroactivity doctrine. See
Smithers v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs., No. 8:09-cv-2200-T-17EAJ, 2011 WL 2446576 (M.D. Fla.
June 15, 2011); Grim v. Buss, No. 3:08cv2/MCR, 2011 WL 1299930 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011).
In both cases, the district courts rejected the defendants' Ring claim because one of the
defendants' aggravators was a prior violent felony. See Smithers, 2011 WL 2446576, at *48-49;
Grim, 2011 WL 1299930, at *65-66. As will become clear, part of what made the Evans case so
compelling was that Evans's Ring claim was not barred by the retroactivity doctrine and that
Evans was not convicted of a violent felony prior to his murder conviction. See generally Evans v.
State, 808 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2002).
190. Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d 92, 95 (Fla. 2002).
191. Id. Evans was nineteen at the time of the murder. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 95 n. I.
196. Id. at 95. Indian River County court documents reveal that Connie received a domestic
violence injunction against Alan in 1988. See Joe Callahan, Women Arrested for Alleged Hit on
Husband in Vero, OCALA STAR-BANNER, July 23, 1997, at IA. The documents state that Alan had
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insurance policy, 197 Connie approached several individuals about killing
Alan in the weeks leading up to the murder.1 98 After each person
refused, Connie asked Waddell if she knew of anyone who would be
willing to commit the murder. 99 Waddell suggested that Evans might be
a willing triggerman. 2° According to Thomas, Evans was to receive "a
camcorder, a stereo, and some insurance money" in exchange for killing
Alan. o2 0
At trial, the testimony established that, although all the conspirators
collaborated to kill the victim, Evans was the plot's "mastermind. "20 2 On
the morning of March 23, 1991, the conspirators arranged the Pfeiffers'
trailer to make it look like a robbery had taken place.20 3 After the trailer
was arranged, Waddell and Evans went to Waddell's parents' house to
steal a gun and a jar of quarters." Waddell, Evans, and Thomas then
went to test-fire the gun.20 5 The conspirators then met back at the trailer
to go over their alibis.206 "Waddell stated that Evans explained that he
was going to hide behind furniture and shoot Alan when he entered the
trailer. 2 07
To establish an alibi for the planned murder, Evans, Waddell, and
Thomas went to the fair later that evening.20 8 At dusk, the trio returned
to the Pfeiffers' trailer so that Evans could make final preparations. 0 9
Waddell and Thomas then left Evans at the trailer and returned to the
fair.210 After remaining at the fair for "one to two hours,"21  Waddell
and Thomas went to the pickup site "where Evans got back into the car
and said, 'It's done.' "212 Waddell testified that Evans told her that he
attacked Connie four times over a two-year period, and that on one occasion, Alan had tried to
suffocate her with a pillow. Id.
197. Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d 92, 98 (Fla. 2002) ("Following the murder of her husband,
Connie moved out of Vero Beach and purchased a horse farm near Ocala worth approximately
$120,000, which was the same amount as the life insurance proceeds.").
198. Id. at 95-96.
199. Id. at 96.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. Waddell and Thomas paid for the fair with the quarters stolen from Waddell's parents'
house. Id. Thomas testified that this was "to avoid having their hands stamped, so it would not
look like they left the fair and later returned." Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 96-97.
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turned up the volume on the stereo to muffle the gunshots, hid behind
some furniture, and shot Alan when he entered the trailer.213 One of the
Pfieffers' neighbors stated that he heard gunshots between 8 p.m. and
8:30 p.m., but did not see anyone running from the trailer.2"4 After the
murder, Thomas, Waddell, and Evans disposed of the gun in a canal
near Yeehaw Junction.215 Then they went back to the fair to meet up
with Connie. 16
Early the next morning, the Vero Beach Police Department
received a call about loud music emanating from the Pfeiffers' trailer.2 7
The police found the trailer's door ajar, and entered.21 8 It was then that
the police discovered Alan Pfeiffer's body.219 Investigators recovered
three bullets from the victim: one from his spine and two from his
head.220 The police also found Alan's life insurance policies lying on the
table.221 The following afternoon, detectives interviewed Connie for the
first time.222 Connie was uncooperative throughout the investigation,
and told investigators that she was at the fair with Waddell, Thomas and
Evans on the evening of the murder.2 23 Waddell, Thomas, and Evans
confirmed Connie's story.224
After the investigation went cold, the Vero Beach Police Depart-
ment reopened the case in 1997.225 Investigators interviewed Thomas
first, who told her version of the story and agreed to wear a wire and
meet with Waddell. 226 The meeting implicated Waddell, who agreed to
cooperate with the police and provide a statement.22 7 Having procured
Thomas's and Waddell's cooperation, the police arrested Connie and
Evans for their involvement in Alan's murder.2
B. Procedural History
Evans was indicted and convicted on one count of first-degree mur-
213. Id. at 97.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 98.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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der.229 The trial court then conducted the requisite separate sentencing
proceeding in front of the trial jury.23 ° By a vote of nine to three, the
jury recommended a death sentence.23' The trial court then held a Spen-
cer hearing.232 After considering the jury's advisory verdict and the evi-
dence presented in the Spencer hearing,
[t]he trial court found the following in aggravation: (1) Evans had
committed the crime for pecuniary gain (great weight); and (2) the
murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated man-
ner without any pretense of legal or moral justification (great weight).
The trial court found only one statutory mitigator: Evans' age of
nineteen when he committed the murder (little weight).
In addition, the trial court found and gave weight to the following
nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Evans' good conduct while in jail (little
weight); (2) Evans' good attitude and conduct while awaiting trial
(little weight); (3) Evans had a difficult childhood (little weight); (4)
Evans was raised without a father (little weight); (5) Evans was the
product of a broken home (little weight); (6) Evans suffered great
trauma during childhood (moderate weight); (7) Evans suffered from
hyperactivity and had a prior psychiatric history and a history of hos-
pitalization for mental illness (moderate weight); (8) Evans was the
father of two young girls (very little weight); (9) Evans believes in
God (very little weight); (10) Evans will adjust well to life in prison
and is unlikely to be a danger to others while serving a life sentence
(very little weight); (11) Evans loves his family and Evans' family
loves him (very little weight).233
After balancing the two aggravating factors against the mitigating fac-
tors, the trial judge concluded that "the aggravation outweighed the miti-
gation," and sentenced Evans to death.234
On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Evans raised four-
teen claims. 235 The court affirmed Evans's conviction and death sen-
tence, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ
of certiorari. 23 6 Evans then sought post-conviction relief in state court,
where he asserted six claims, "including for the first time a claim that
229. Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011), rev'd sub nom. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (1 lth Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
233. Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d 92, 99 (Fla. 2002).
234. Id. at 99-100.
235. See id. at 100.
236. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1254 (citing Evans v. Florida, 537 U.S. 951 (2002)).
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Florida's capital sentencing statute.., violates the Sixth Amendment, as
interpreted in Ring v. Arizona and Apprendi v. New Jersey.' 237 The state
collateral court denied all six claims, and the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed and "denied Evans' petition to it for a writ of habeas corpus. It
also denied his motion for rehearing. 238
On December 1, 2008, Evans filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.239 Evans raised seventeen claims for relief, one of which argued
that Florida's capital sentencing statute violated his constitutional right
to a jury trial.24° Judge Martinez delivered his opinion on June 20, 2011.
C. The District Court Decision24'
After denying Evans's first sixteen claims, the district court granted
Evans habeas corpus relief on his seventeenth claim, holding that the
Florida death penalty scheme violated Evans's constitutional right to a
jury trial.242 Before doing so, however, the court had to wrestle with a
threshold issue: whether Ring could be retroactively applied to the Evans
case.
243
1. RETROACTIVITY
As discussed above, the general rule in federal court is that new
rules of procedure apply retroactively to cases on direct appeal, but not
to cases on collateral appeal.2 44 In Schiro v. Summerlin,245 the Court
determined that Ring enunciated a procedural rule, and that it therefore
only applied retroactively to cases that had not become final before Ring
was decided. 246 Thus, the question for the district court was whether
Evans's case had become final before June of 2002, the date that the
Court delivered its opinion in Ring.
The Florida Supreme Court held in Johnson v. State247 that "a death
sentence becomes final for the purposes of Ring once [this] Court has
affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and issued the
237. Id. (internal citations omitted).
238. Id. at 1255 (citing Evans v. State, 995 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2008)).
239. Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011), rev'd sub nom. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11 th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
240. Id.
241. Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2011).
242. See id. at *54.
243. See id. at *47.
244. See generally supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
245. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
246. See id. at 355-57.
247. 904 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2005).
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mandate."24 Thus, according to the Florida Supreme Court, "Evans's
death sentence became final after this Court both affirmed on direct
appeal and issued mandate in February 2002. Because Ring was not
decided until June 2002, Evans cannot rely on it to vacate his death
sentence."24 9
The district court disagreed with the Florida Supreme Court's rule
on retroactivity.25 ° It held that Evans's death sentence did not become
final until the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on Evans's
direct appeal in October of 2002.251 "Ring was decided in June of 2002,
which makes it applicable to Mr. Evans's petition. 2 52 Thus, the court
was free to evaluate Evans's Sixth Amendment concerns using Ring as
precedent.
2. RING ANALYSIS
The district court began addressing Evans's jury-trial-guarantee
claim by summarizing Florida's capital sentencing statute, the applica-
tion of the statute to Evans, and the relevant Supreme Court precedent,
including Walton, Apprendi, and Ring." 3 Then the court proclaimed:
While Ring in certain respects has a limited holding, it does clearly
provide that the Constitution requires that the jury find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, any aggravating factor that must be found before
the death penalty may be imposed. Implicit in this holding is that the
jury's fact finding be meaningful. As the Florida sentencing statute
currently operates in practice, the Court finds that the process com-
pleted before the imposition of the death penalty is in violation of
Ring in that the jury's recommendation is not a factual finding suffi-
cient to satisfy the Constitution; rather, it is simply a sentencing rec-
ommendation made without a clear factual finding. In effect, the only
meaningful findings regarding aggravating factors are made by the
judge.254
Because the jury's advisory verdict does not render a meaningful factual
determination regarding aggravating factors, the court concluded that
Florida's capital sentencing procedure is, in effect, no different from the
Arizona procedure in Ring.255 Thus, the court held that Florida's scheme
248. Evans v. State, 995 So. 2d 933, 952 (Fla. 2008) (citing Johnson, 904 So. 2d at 407).
249. Id.
250. See Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *47 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011), rev'd sub nom. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
251. See id. (citing Evans v. Florida, 537 U.S. 951 (2002)).
252. Id.
253. Id. at *48-52.
254. Id. at *53 (emphasis added).
255. Id.
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violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial.2" 6
For the district court, the advisory verdict from the jury is not
meaningful for two reasons. First, as discussed above, there are no spe-
cific findings of fact made by the jury.257 This means that the judge,
defendant, and reviewing courts have no idea how the jury reached its
conclusion.258 In delivering the advisory verdict, "[i]t is conceivable that
some of the jurors did not find the existence of an aggravating circum-
stance, or that each juror found a different aggravating circumstance, or
perhaps all jurors found the existence of an aggravating circumstance
but some thought that the mitigating circumstances outweighed
them. '259 Indeed, when the judge imposes the sentence, "[t]he defendant
has no way of knowing whether or not the jury found the same aggravat-
ing factors as the judge," and "the judge .. .may find an aggravating
circumstance that was not found by the jury while failing to find the
aggravating circumstance that was found by the jury. '26 ° Thus, the dis-
trict court concluded that a procedure that does not control for all these
variables cannot be reconciled with Ring.
Second, and most troubling to the district court as it applies to
Evans's case, is that there is nothing in the record to show that the "jury
found the existence of a single aggravating factor by even a simple
majority."26' In Evans, the jury received two aggravating factors to con-
sider.262 The jury returned an advisory verdict for death by a vote of nine
to three.263 Thus, "it is possible that the nine jurors who voted for death
reached their determination by having four jurors find one aggravator
while five jurors found another. Either of these results would have the
aggravator found by less than a majority of the jurors. '"264 The district
court reasoned that Ring, at the very minimum, held that "the defendant
is entitled to a jury's majority fact finding of the existence of an aggra-
vating factor; not simply a majority of jurors finding the existence of any
unspecified combination of aggravating factors upon which the judge
may or may not base the death sentence. 265 If Florida's statute cannot
guarantee that even a simple majority of jurors found at least one aggra-
256. Id. at *54.
257. Id. at *53.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *54.
262. Id. at *4 ("(1) Evans had committed the crime for pecuniary gain... ; and (2) the murder
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of legal or
moral justification.").
263. Id.
264. Id. at *54.
265. Id.
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vating factor before the judge ultimately sentences the defendant to
death, then the statute must be an unconstitutional violation of the jury
trial guarantee.
The district court opinion also included an interesting analysis of
the meaning of "maximum penalty" as enunciated in Ring.26 6 In Justice
Quince's concurring opinion in Bottoson, she suggested that Ring "has
carved out a new meaning for the term 'statutory maximum.' The term
statutory maximum has traditionally referred to that sentence which a
state legislature or Congress has determined to be the outer limit of what
can be imposed for a particular crime. '2 67 But in Cunningham v. Cali-
fornia,268 the Supreme Court stated that "the relevant 'statutory maxi-
mum.., is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any addi-
tional findings.' ,2 69 Although Florida makes death the maximum pen-
alty for a capital felony in a formal sense,270 by explicitly cross-
referencing Section 921.141,271 the effect is to make the maximum pen-
alty for a capital offense life imprisonment, with death being an option
only with the finding of an aggravating factor.2 72 Thus, it was not Ring
that established a new meaning for the term statutory maximum, but
Florida's capital sentencing statute itself 2 73
The district court's order on the Sixth Amendment issue did not
mention Spaziano or Hildwin.27 4 An appeal to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals came swiftly. The Eleventh Circuit focused on the
Supreme Court precedent that specifically upheld Florida's death pen-
266. Id. at *53.
267. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 700 (Fla. 2002) (Quince, J., specially concurring).
268. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
269. Id. at 290 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004)).
270. See FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (2010),
271. See § 775.082(1) (cross-referencing FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2010)).
272. Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *53 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011), rev'd sub nom. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (1 1th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
273. Interestingly, Furman probably requires this type of statutory construction. The Court's
major concern in Furman was the arbitrary application of the death penalty. See supra notes
22-29 and accompanying text. The specification of statutory aggravating factors was many states'
solution to this problem. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
This, of course, implicated Sixth Amendment concerns, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
concurrence in Ring. Id. But some states took a different approach after Furman. For example, a
1974 Delaware statute called for mandatory death sentences for anyone convicted of first degree
murder. See Sheri Johnson et al., The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L.
Rav. 1925, 1929 (2012). The Supreme Court overruled these mandatory capital sentencing
statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976), as violations of the Eight Amendment. See id. Thus, Delaware was forced to change
its statute, which it has done three times since 1977. Id. at 1929-30.
274. See Evans, 2011 WL 9717450, at *47-54.
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alty statute, not the more recent precedent that struck down death pen-
alty statutes in other states.
D. The Eleventh Circuit Decision275
Judge Edward Carnes is no stranger to the death penalty. Prior to
being nominated and confirmed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1992, he served as an assistant attorney general for the state of Ala-
bama for seventeen years. 27 6 From 1981 to 1992, he headed up the
state's Capital Punishment and Post-Conviction Litigation Division.277
He also drafted Alabama's capital sentencing statute. 78 Given the strong
similarities between the Florida regime and the Alabama regime, 279 it is
fitting that he was charged with delivering the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion.
The introduction to the opinion is as eloquent as it is suggestive of
the holding to come:
Confident that he knew what the future would bring, one of Shake-
speare's characters boasted that "[t]here are many events in the womb
of time which will be delivered." On the subject of lower courts pre-
dicting that the Supreme Court is going to overrule one of its own
decisions, however, Judge Hand cautioned against "embrac[ing] the
exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in
the womb of time, but whose birth is distant." The Supreme Court
has made Hand's warning a clear command by repeatedly instructing
lower courts that when one of its earlier decisions with direct applica-
tion to a case appears to rest on reasons rejected in a more recent line
of decisions, we must follow the directly applicable decision and
leave to the high Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions. As will become apparent, those instructions are dispositive of
the State's appeal from the grant of habeas corpus relief in this
case.
2 80
275. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub
nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
276. Richard Lacayo, To the Bench Via the Chair, TiME, Sept. 14, 1992, at 41.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. "Alabama's capital sentencing scheme is much like that of Florida." Harris v. Alabama,
513 U.S. 504, 508 (1995). It provides for a separate sentencing proceeding before a jury. See ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (2012). It requires no specific findings of fact by the jury on aggravating or
mitigating factors. See § 13A-5-46(e). After deliberation, the jury delivers an advisory verdict for
life imprisonment or death. See id. The jury may recommend death only if ten jurors so agree. See
§ 13A-5-46(f). The judge must then deliver a detailed statement listing the aggravating and
mitigating factors found and the sentence imposed. See § 13A-5-47(d). "While the jury's
recommendation . . . shall be given consideration, it is not binding on the court." § 13A-5-47(e).
Unlike Florida, Alabama judges do not need to give the jury recommendation "great weight." See
Harris, 513 U.S. at 508-15 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
280. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1252 (quoting William Shakespeare, Othello, Act I, Scene 3, lines
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For the Eleventh Circuit, the union of the principle of stare decisis and
the Supreme Court's holding in Hildwin outweighed any Sixth Amend-
ment argument under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Ring. Thus, the
federal appeals court reversed the district court's grant of "federal
habeas relief to Evans on Ring grounds." '281
Review of Evans's Ring claim began with a summary of the two
parties' arguments and the court's own reasoning.2 82 For the State, the
fact that a jury is instructed not to recommend the death penalty without
finding at least one aggravating circumstance, and the requirement that a
judge give the jury's advisory verdict "great weight," puts the Florida
procedure in compliance with the Sixth Amendment and Ring.283 For
Evans, "the district court got it fight because under Florida's sentencing
procedure a judge and not the jury actually finds the facts necessary to
establish an aggravating circumstance. ' 284 For the court, three lines of
Supreme Court decisions were relevant to the case: (1) decisions that
specifically upheld Florida's capital punishment statute (culminating in
Hildwin); (2) decisions that struck down Arizona's former capital sen-
tencing procedures (culminating in Ring); and (3) decisions that
"instruct[ ] us to follow directly applicable Supreme Court decisions
until that Court itself explicitly overrules them.
285
The court then analyzed each line of cases. On the Hildwin line of
cases, the court noted that Hildwin "is directly on point against Evans's
contention and the district court's ruling. ' 286 Furthermore, the court
pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Alabama,287 in
which the Court looked favorably upon "Florida's Tedder standard" as
adding "a measure of protection to the jury's role in sentencing. '288 The
Florida Supreme Court's "stringent application of the Tedder standard"
was also important to the court.289 On the Ring line of cases, the court
412-13 and Spector Motor Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.,
dissenting)).
281. Id. at 1265.
282. See id. at 1255-56.
283. See id. ("[T]he court must independently consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and reach its decision on the appropriate penalty, giving great weigh to the jury's
advisory sentence.") (citing Ault v. State, 53 So. 175, 200 (Fla. 2010)).
284. Id. at 1256.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1258.
287. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
288. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1258. The "Tedder standard" is the requirement that the judge give the
jury's advisory verdict "great weight." See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
289. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1258. ("[T]he last time the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a trial
judge's decision to sentence to death a defendant for whom the jury had not recommended a death
sentence was eighteen years ago."). This is not entirely true, but the court's ultimate point still
stands. See supra note 53. See also Evans, 699 F.3d at 1258 n.6.
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looked at the language in Walton and Ring that "may be read to imply a
retreat from the reasoning behind the Hildwin decision. ' 29° It also
pointed to "indications in Ring that the Court did not mean to overrule
even implicitly its Hildwin decision. ' 291 The court then concluded that,
at best, Ring "arguably conflicts with the Hildwin decision, and it argua-
bly was implicitly overruled. That is not enough for Evans to prevail in
the district court or in this court. 2 92
But the coup de grdce for Judge Carnes was the third line of cases.
To that end, he noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has not always been
consistent in its decisions or in its instructions to lower courts," but that
"[t]here are . . . some things the Court has been perfectly consistent
about, and one of them is that 'it is [that] Court's prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents.' ,,29' He also cited the same language
from Rodriguez de Quijas that the Florida Supreme Court cited in Bot-
toson and King.294 "[E]ven if the earlier decision has 'infirmities' and
'increasingly wobbly moth-eaten foundations,"' the court said, "we have
always been careful to obey the supreme prerogative rule and not usurp
the Supreme Court's authority."'2 95 Thus, because of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hildwin, and because the Supreme Court did not
explicitly overrule Hildwin in Ring, the court concluded that it must
uphold the Florida capital sentencing statute.296
IV. AN ISSUE RIPE FOR THE SUPREME COURT
In reversing the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief to
Evans, the Eleventh Circuit decided to remain faithful to the bedrock
principle of stare decisis.297 The term stare decisis comes from the Latin
phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "stand by the
thing decided and do not disturb the calm. '298 In the United States, the
term has special meaning when "the thing decided" comes from the
United States Supreme Court. 2 9 9 As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out,
290. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1262. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text for a full
explanation on the significance of Hildwin's differentiation between sentencing factors and
elements of the offense, and the end of this distinction in Ring.
291. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1262. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text for a full
explanation of the significance of Florida's procedures being in the "hybrid" category in Ring.
292. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1262.
293. Id. at 1263 (quoting United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001)).
294. Id. See also supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
295. Evans, 699 F.3d at 1264 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
296. Id. at 1264-65.
297. Id. at 1263-65.
298. Mark Sabel, The Role of Stare Decisis in Construing the Alabama Constitution of 1901,
53 ALA. L. Rav. 273, 274 (2001).
299. See Evans, 699 F.3d at 1263-65 (11th Cir. 2012).
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"the Court has been perfectly consistent" in its instruction to lower
courts "that 'it is [that] Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its
precedents.' 300 After Ring, the Florida Supreme Court decided to find
"safe harbor" in the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Spazi-
ano and Hildwin.30 1 This position was perfectly acceptable because Ring
did not expressly overrule those cases.3°2 In Evans, the Eleventh Circuit
wisely followed suit. 30 3 It should, and it will, require a Supreme Court
decision to strike down Florida's capital sentencing scheme as a viola-
tion of the jury trial guarantee.
However, the Eleventh Circuit decision also demonstrates the diffi-
culty that courts have had in finding a principled way to reconcile Ring
with Florida's death-penalty procedures. In Bottoson and King, all seven
justices on Florida's Supreme Court filed separate concurring opinions
apart from the short per curiam opinions. 3' Each justice concurred for
one or more of the following three reasons: (1) Ring did not explicitly
overrule "twenty-six years" of Supreme Court precedent; 305 (2) the
Supreme Court decided to lift the stay of execution for Bottoson and
King without mentioning Ring;3° 6 and (3) each defendant had a prior
violent felony aggravator, making them death-eligible anyway. 307 Four
justices expressed significant anxiety about the future of Florida's
scheme in light of Ring.3"8 No justice speculated as to how Ring and the
Florida sentencing statute might coexist, other than to say that in Flor-
ida, unlike in Arizona, the "trial judge and jury jointly make the decision
concerning the existence of aggravating circumstances."3 9 The Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Evans offers the following in footnote eight:
A principled argument can . . . be made that the result in Hildwin is
not inconsistent with the result in Ring. And that is especially true in
cases like this one where no rational jury could have found the defen-
dant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the murder with which he
was charged without implicitly finding that at least one of the statu-
tory aggravating circumstances existed. There was no evidence
300. Id. at 1263 (quoting United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001)).
301. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 704 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, C.J., concurring in the
result only).
302. See id. at 695.
303. See Evans, 699 F.3d at 1264-65.
304. See generally Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143
(2002).
305. See, e.g., Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 698 (Wells, J., concurring specially).
306. See, e.g., id. at 697 (Wells, J., concurring specially).
307. See, e.g., id. at 719 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only).
308. See id. at 703-10 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only); id. at 710-19 (Shaw, J.,
concurring in result only); id. at 719-25 (Pariente, J., concurring in result only); id. at 725-35
(Lewis, J., concurring in result only).
309. Id. at 703 (Quince, J., specially concurring).
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presented, and there could have been no rational inference from any
of the evidence that was presented, that Evans committed the murder
but did not do it for pecuniary gain.
310
This is hardly a principled argument for reconciling Hildwin and Ring.
Rather, this is a fact-specific argument that may be true in some
murders, but that fails to resolve the underlying conflict in a way that
would be applicable to all murders. Thus, two of the highest courts in
the land have proved to be incapable of squaring Ring with Florida's
capital punishment procedures. Yet, more than ten years after Ring,
Florida's statute remains unchanged.
It is for that reason that the district court's decision in Evans, while
improper in its disregard for the principle of stare decisis, was nonethe-
less necessary. It drew attention to the "moth-eaten foundations" of
Hildwin.31 ' It forced the State to bring to bear the full brunt of its legal
argument on appeal to Eleventh Circuit.31 2 It helped clarify the issues for
a potential grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.3 13
And it demanded certainty in an area of the law that, because of Ring, is
anything but certain. Meanwhile, as the effect of the retroactivity doc-
trine on Ring continues to fade, an increasing number of defendants will
have viable Sixth Amendment claims. As one legal blogger remarked
about Evans, "Clearly, Judge Carnes is setting the stage for a Supreme
Court appeal." 3 4 However, despite the invitation to weigh in, the
Supreme Court denied Evans's petition for a writ of certiorari on May20, 2013 .3 15
310. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.8 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
311. Id. at 1264 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
312. On Evans's collateral appeal to the district court, the State devoted only three paragraphs
in its reply brief to Evans's Sixth Amendment claim. See Brief for Respondent at 176-77, Evans
v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2011), ECF No. 9, rev'd
sub nom. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub
nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013). On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the
State dedicated 13,930 words in its initial brief to this one issue, just seventy words shy of the
14,000 word limit imposed by the court. See Brief for Petitioner at 59, Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't
of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11 th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-14498), cert. denied sub nora. Evans v. Crews,
133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
313. See supra note 312.
314. Robyn Hagan Cain, Is Florida's Capital Sentencing Statute Unconstitutional?,
FINDLAW.COM, Oct. 24, 2012, http:l/blogs.findlaw.comeleventhcircuit/2012/10/is-floridas-
capital-sentencing-statute-unconstitutional.html.
315. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., No. 12-1134
(Mar. 18, 2013), denied 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
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V. A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY MISSED: WHY THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED CERTIORARI IN EVANS
The Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari depended, in part,
on whether Evans effectively exposed the potential conflicts between
Ring and Florida's capital punishment statute.3 16 Chief Justice Anstead's
concurring opinion in Bottoson provides a useful framework for organiz-
ing these potential conflicts for the purposes of evaluating how effec-
tively Evans clarified the Sixth Amendment issues.317 He identified five
specific concerns with Florida's death penalty procedure. 318 First, Flor-
ida's scheme "relies upon [a] finding of facts determining the existence
of statutory aggravators that have been made by a judge and not by a
jury." '3 19 Second, in determining the appropriate sentence, the trial judge
is "not limited to the aggravation" that was "submitted to the jury," and
"is vested with the authority to override the jury's advisory recommen-
dation."320 Third, the jury makes no "findings of fact or any actual deter-
mination of the existence of any aggravating circumstances. ' 321 Fourth,
"the jury renders only an advisory recommendation as to penalty." '322
Fifth, the "advisory recommendation is not required to be
unanimous. 323
The facts in Evans successfully illuminated Chief Justice Anstead's
first concern about judicial versus jury fact finding in Florida's sentenc-
ing statute. Ring expressly held that "defendants are entitled to a jury
determination and findings of fact as to the existence of any aggravating
factors necessary to increase their sentences. ' 324 Florida law provides
only for an advisory verdict from the jury on the appropriate sentence.325
It does not provide for specific jury findings on the existence of aggra-
316. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., No.
12-1134 (Mar. 18, 2013) (contending that Evans was the "ideal vehicle" for the Court to resolve
the issue), with Brief of Respondent Michael D. Crews, Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs. in Opposition
at 19, Evans, No. 12-1134 (Apr. 18, 2013) (contending that Evans was a "very poor vehicle" for
the Court to resolve the issue). Florida argued, presumably rather persuasively, that Evans was
"tangled in skein of procedural complexities, starting with the issue of whether the Florida
Supreme Court's direct appeal opinion rejecting a Sixth Amendment claim is due AEDPA
deference." Id. The validity of that assertion is beyond the scope of this article, but it is possible
that the Court determined that procedural obstacles would prevent it from reaching the merits of
Evans's constitutional claim, and it thus decided to deny certiorari.
317. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 693, 704-10 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, C.J., concurring in
result only).
318. See id. at 704-05 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result only).
319. Id. at 704.
320. Id. at 705.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2010).
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vating circumstances.326 In Evans, this scheme resulted in a jury consid-
ering two aggravating factors and voting nine to three in favor of death,
making it "possible that the nine jurors who voted for death reached
their determination by having four jurors find one aggravator while five
jurors found another. ' 327 If no single aggravating factor received a
majority vote from the jury, can the judge consider it in making the
ultimate sentencing determination? Ring seems to hold that a judge can-
not consider any aggravator that has not, at a minimum, received a
majority vote from the jury.328 Thus, the facts in Evans effectively
addressed Chief Justice Anstead's first misgiving in Bottoson.
Evans did not call into question Chief Justice Anstead's second
problem in Bottoson. Florida law requires that a judge tell the jury what
aggravating factors it may find before making its sentencing recommen-
dation.329 However, Florida law also allows a judge to find the existence
of an aggravating factor that was not presented to the jury when he or
she makes the ultimate sentencing determination.33° Judges can also
override a jury's advisory verdict as long as the judge gave the advisory
verdict "great weight. ' 331 Evans did not include any of these factual sce-
narios, so the Supreme Court would have been unable to reverse the
Eleventh Circuit on these grounds.
Chief Justice Anstead' s third and fourth concerns are about whether
the jury's advisory sentence (which includes a vote count) constitutes
meaningful fact finding under the Supreme Court's holding in Ring.332
In his concurring opinion in Bottoson, he stated:
[C]ompared to our ability to review the actual findings of fact made
by the trial judge, there could hardly be any meaningful appellate
review of a Florida jury's advisory recommendation to a trial judge
since that review would rest on sheer speculation as to the basis of
the recommendation, whether considering the jury collectively or the
326. See id.
327. Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *54 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011), rev'd sub nom. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11 th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
328. See id.
329. See Stand. Jury Instrs. in Crim. Cases - NO. 96-1, 690 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (Fla. 1997)
(noting that the judge should "give only those aggravating circumstances for which evidence has
been presented" to the jury).
330. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 765 (Fla. 2007) (striking an aggravating
factor found by the sentencing judge, not because the factor was not presented to the jury during
sentencing, but because the factor was not supported by substantial evidence).
331. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) ("In order to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.").
332. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 693, 705 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, C.J., concurring in result
only).
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jurors individually. In other words, from a jury's bare advisory rec-
ommendation, it would be impossible to tell which, if any, aggravat-
ing circumstances a jury or any individual juror may have determined
existed.3 33
All that Evans could determine from the jury's recommendation at sen-
tencing was that (a) at least nine jurors found at least one aggravating
factor, and (b) only nine jurors decided that whatever aggravating fac-
tors they found outweighed whatever mitigating factors they found.
Evans did not know if a majority of the jurors found any one aggravat-
ing factor or if any of the three jurors who voted for life imprisonment
found an aggravating factor. Thus, the jury's recommendation in Evans
illustrated Chief Justice Anstead's worry about the lack of meaningful
jury fact finding in Florida's death penalty statute.
The facts in Evans also revealed concerns about the lack of una-
nimity in a jury's advisory verdict in favor of the death penalty. The
district court's opinion in Evans acknowledged that unanimous jury ver-
dicts are not constitutionally required in state trials.334 However, in Flor-
ida, "the requirement of unanimity has been an inviolate tenet of Florida
jurisprudence since the State was created." '335 In his concurring opinion
in Bottoson, Justice Shaw noted that Ring made "an aggravating circum-
stance necessary for imposition of the death sentence ...subject[ ] to
the same rigors of proof as every other element of the charged
offense." '336 Thus, Justice Shaw concluded that "[w]hen the dictates of
Ring are applied to Florida's capital sentencing statute, I believe our
statute is rendered flawed because it lacks a unanimity requirement for
the death qualifying aggravator. '' 337 Because the jury recommended the
death penalty in Evans by a vote of nine to three, Evans exposed the lack
of unanimity issue as well.
Thus, Evans effectively exposed four of the five potential inconsis-
tencies between Ring and the Florida capital sentencing procedure that
Chief Justice Anstead identified in Bottoson. The facts in Evans most
powerfully illuminated Chief Justice Anstead's first and third concerns,
because the combination of two potential aggravating circumstances and
a nine to three vote in favor of death leads to the possibility of results
that cannot be reconciled with Ring.338 The Eleventh Circuit's decision
333. Id. at 708.
334. See Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *54 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011) (citing Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)), rev'd sub nom. Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't
of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11 th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub non. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393
(May 20, 2013).
335. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 714 (Shaw, J., concurring in result only).
336. Id. at 715.
337. Id. at 718.
338. See Evans, 2011 WL 9717450, at *54.
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in Evans included a fact-specific argument, which stated that no juror
could have found Evans guilty of murder in the first place without also
finding that he committed the murder for pecuniary gain. 339 But this
argument failed to recognize the fundamental disconnect between the
jury's advisory verdict and the judge's sentencing determination: the
judge found, and gave "great weight" to, two aggravating factors
("pecuniary gain" and "cruel, calculated, and premeditated") before sen-
tencing Evans to death. n° It was conceivable that a majority of the
jurors did not find that Evans committed the murder in a cruel, calcu-
lated, and premeditated manner, yet the judge still included that aggra-
vating circumstance in his analysis to determine Evans's sentence. This
is what cannot be reconciled with Ring's requirement that "the jury find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, any aggravating factor that must be found
before the death penalty may be imposed. 341 While there might be
future cases that more forcefully reveal the inconsistencies between Ring
and Florida's capital sentencing scheme, Evans made a compelling can-
didate for Supreme Court review. The Court missed a golden opportu-
nity to settle the issue once and for all.
VI. PROACTIVE COMPLIANCE WITH RING
When a United States Supreme Court decision calls into question
the constitutionality of a state statute without expressly striking the stat-
ute down, the state does not have to wait for the Court to expressly act
against the statute.342 The state can take proactive steps to bring the stat-
ute in compliance with the Court's decision, thereby negating the need
for judicial review.34 3 One way to do this is for the state legislature to
revise the statute. 34 After Ring, one state that employed a death penalty
procedure similar to Florida's procedure did exactly that.345
After the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ring in June
of 2002, the Delaware legislature realized that its capital sentencing stat-
ute may no longer be constitutional.346 Prior to 1991, Delaware's proce-
dure included a separate sentencing proceeding before the jury for the
presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence.347 If "the jury
339. See Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.8 (11 th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
340. See Evans, 2011 WL 9717450, at *4.
341. Id. at *53.
342. See, e.g., infra notes 346-58 and accompanying text.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, et al., The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97
IOWA L. REv. 1925, 1931 (2012).
347. See id. at 1930.
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unanimously concluded that the prosecution had proven, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circum-
stance," then the jury could sentence the defendant to death.34 8 If the
jury then decided to actually sentence the defendant to death (requiring a
second unanimous vote), then that determination was binding on the
judge.3 4 9 In 1991, there was a public outcry after a jury failed to impose
death sentences in a highly publicized murder trial involving four
defendants convicted of shooting two security guards during a rob-
bery.35° In response, the Delaware legislature amended its death penalty
procedures by adopting the Florida model, vesting the ultimate sentenc-
ing authority with the judge.3 1 But after Ring, Delaware saw the writing
on the wall, so its legislature made further revisions in July of 2002.352
Today, the jury's role in Delaware's capital punishment procedure
is two-fold: (a) determine whether any of the statutory aggravating fac-
tors exist beyond a reasonable doubt and (b) recommend a sentence of
death or life imprisonment after weighing the aggravating and mitigating
factors.35 3 The jury must unanimously find the existence of an aggravat-
ing factor.35" The jury's recommendation is determined by a simple
majority vote.3 55 After the jury has made its findings, the judge conducts
his or her own weighing using only the aggravating factors unanimously
found by the jury.356 "The jury's recommendation . . . shall be given
such consideration as deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the
particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and
the character and propensities of the offender as found to exist by the
Court."' 35 7 The jury's recommendation is not binding on the judge's final
sentencing determination. 8
Delaware's new capital sentencing statute withstands Sixth Amend-
ment scrutiny under Ring. Ring does not require that a jury make the
final sentencing determination.359 All it requires is that juries make the
factual findings necessary to enhance the maximum sentence for murder
348. Id.
349. See id.
350. See id. at 1930-31 (citing Robertson v. State, 630 A.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Del. 1993)).
351. Id. at 1931.
352. Id.
353. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)-(4) (2012).
354. See tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1).
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. Id.
358. See id.
359. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("the unfortunate
fact is that today's judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing"). See generally Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
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from life imprisonment to death.36° Under the statutory processes of
both Delaware and Florida, that requires finding the existence of at least
one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.36 1 Delaware's
new death penalty statute requires a unanimous jury finding of at least
one aggravating factor, but vests the ultimate sentencing determination
in the judge.362 Florida's statute continues to vest the determination of
the existence of aggravating factors and of the appropriate sentence in
the judge. 63 If Florida law, like Delaware's new capital sentencing stat-
ute, required that juries make the aggravating factor determination, then
Florida law would be in compliance with Ring.
Some of the Justices on the Florida Supreme Court have advocated
for the use of special verdict forms when the jury delivers its recommen-
dation.3 4 Special verdict forms would "require the jury to indicate what
aggravators the jury has found and the jury vote as to each
aggravator. ' 365 In Bottoson, Justice Pariente argued that special verdict
forms could be mandated by the Florida Supreme Court without violat-
ing the Florida statute because nothing in the death penalty statute "pre-
cludes specific jury findings as to the existence of aggravating
circumstances. '366 Presumably, if special verdict forms were used, then
a majority vote in favor of the existence of an aggravating circumstance
would be considered a jury finding of that aggravating circumstance.367
Thus, special verdict forms would make the effect of Florida's death
penalty procedure almost identical to Delaware's statute, with the only
difference being that Delaware requires a unanimous jury finding on the
existence of an aggravating factor.
The use of special verdict forms might make Florida's capital sen-
tencing procedure constitutional. The United States Supreme Court has
held that unanimous jury verdicts are not constitutionally required in
state trials.368 Thus, a factual finding on the existence of an aggravating
factor made by a majority of a jury might pass constitutional muster. On
the other hand, Ring held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial
360. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("What today's decision says is that the
jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed.").
361. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2012).
362. See tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1).
363. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141.
364. See, e.g., Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 723-24 (Fla. 2002) (Pariente, J., concurring
in result only).
365. Id. at 723.
366. Id. at 724.
367. Id. at 723 ("I would immediately require that trial courts utilize special verdicts that
require the jury to indicate what aggravators the jury has found and the jury vote as to each
aggravator.").
368. See generally Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (requiring unanimous jury
verdicts in federal trials but not in state trials).
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by jury applies to all the elements necessary to sentence a defendant to
death for capital murder, including the aggravating factors. 369 The use of
the special verdict form would lead to differential treatment of the ele-
ments of a capital murder conviction that are provable during the guilt
phase (requiring unanimity), and the aggravating factors provable at the
sentencing proceeding (requiring a simple majority). Does Ring require
that all the elements of the offense punishable by death be subjected to
the same crucible of persuasion (as reflected through the proportion of
the jury that believes the fact in question has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt)? Maybe. But, at a minimum, it is clear that a special
verdict form would move Florida's sentencing statute closer to being in
compliance with Ring.
Finally, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Ring provides Flor-
ida with another acceptable capital sentencing procedure under the Sixth
Amendment. Toward the end of the opinion, he wrote,
[T]he unfortunate fact is that today's judgment has nothing to do with
jury sentencing. What today's decision says is that the jury must find
the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed. Those
States that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may
continue to do so-by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating
factor in the sentencing phase or, more simply, by placing the aggra-
vating-factor determination (where it logically belongs anyway) in
the guilt phase.37o
By putting the "aggravating-factor determination" in the guilt phase,
Florida would be able to eliminate the sentencing proceeding before the
jury altogether. Florida could also retain the jury recommendation of life
imprisonment or death, and the judge could still render the ultimate sen-
tencing determination, armed only with the aggravating factors the jury
found beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a procedure would be efficient,
effective, and constitutional under Ring.
VII. CONCLUSION: PROACTIVE REFORM IN FLORIDA MAY HELP SAVE
THE DEATH PENALTY
Florida's death penalty statute is at a crossroads. Created in the
wake of the United States Supreme Court's seminal Eighth Amendment
decision in Furman,37 1 the statute attempted to alleviate the Court's con-
cerns about the arbitrary application of the death penalty by creating
statutory aggravating circumstances that must be present to make the
369. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
370. Id. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
371. See Driggs, supra, note 33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 67:933
THE EVANS CASE
convicted murderer death-eligible.372 Supreme Court cases such as Prof-
fitt, Spaziano, and Hildwin validated Florida's capital sentencing scheme
under both the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.373 The Sixth Amendment
jury-trial-guarantee decisions, however, were based on a distinction
between "sentencing factors" and "elements of the offense" that per-
sisted until the Court decided Apprendi.37 4 That non-death-penalty case
forced the Court to rethink its previous holdings in the death-penalty
context.375 As a result, in Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court overturned
its decision in Walton and struck down Arizona's judge-only capital sen-
tencing statute as a violation of the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury
trial.3 76 Since the Ring decision, Florida's "hybrid" capital sentencing
process has been called into question,377 even though the Florida
Supreme Court has consistently held that the statute does not violate the
Sixth Amendment.378
The district court's decision in Evans represented the first time that
a federal court interpreted Florida's capital sentencing statute in light of
Ring.3 79 In granting Evans habeas corpus relief, the court forced the
State to fully argue its case for the constitutionality of the statute on
appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.38° Writing for a unanimous Eleventh Cir-
cuit, Judge Carnes invoked Hildwin and the foundational legal doctrine
of stare decisis to reverse the district court,381 while also recognizing
that Hildwin may rely on reasoning (the sentencing-factors/elements-of-
the-offense distinction) that had since been rejected by the Court. 382 The
United States Supreme Court denied Evans's petition for a writ of certi-
orari, but more constitutional challenges will be forthcoming as the
effects of the retroactivity doctrine on Ring continue to fade.383
Nevertheless, Florida can avert a constitutional challenge to its cap-
ital sentencing statute by simply revising the statute. A bifurcated sys-
tem that mimics Delaware's new capital sentencing statute would
372. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2010).
373. See Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
374. See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S.
638 (1989) (per curiam).
375. See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
376. See id. at 609.
377. Id. at 608 n.6.
378. See generally, e.g., Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831
So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002).
379. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
381. See Evans v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249, 1263 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (May 20, 2013).
382. See id.
383. See generally supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
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suffice.3 84 So would moving the aggravating-factor determination to the
guilt phase, as Justice Scalia suggested in his concurrence in Ring.385
The use of special verdict forms during the sentencing proceeding would
also help improve the constitutionality of the statute.386 Proactive com-
pliance with Ring is the best solution for Florida. If Florida does not act
now, it will likely be left scrambling to amend its death penalty statute
after the Supreme Court finally takes a case that challenges the statute's
constitutionality.
Proponents of the death penalty may not want to consider revising
the law until the Supreme Court forces them to act, but a proactive
change in the law would actually secure the death penalty's future in
Florida, not jeopardize it. When Connecticut repealed the death penalty
in 2012, it became, at the time, the fifth state in the previous five years
to do So.3 87 Upon its repeal, Governor Dannel Malloy noted that "[i]n
the last 52 years, only two people have been put to death in Connecti-
cut-and both of them volunteered for it. Instead, the people of this state
pay for appeal after appeal, and then watch time and again as defendants
are marched in front of the cameras, giving them a platform of public
attention they don't deserve. 388 Waning support for the death penalty is
not the result of "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society," '3 89 but the result of a desire to cut costs.
"[H]ighly convoluted" procedures that are at odds with established
Supreme Court precedent only invite stronger and more meritorious
appeals, thereby increasing the cost of the system.39° Thus, Florida's
death penalty proponents should actively support a revision to the statu-
tory scheme that puts the aggravating-factor determination in the hands
of a jury. This would make Florida's capital sentencing statute constitu-
tional under the Supreme Court's decision in Ring.
384. See supra notes 353-63 and accompanying text.
385. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
386. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 723-24 (Fla. 2002) (Pariente, J., concurring in
result only).
387. David Ariosto, Connecticut Becomes 17th State to Abolish Death Penalty, CNN.coM,
Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/25/justice/connecticut-death-penalty-law-repealed/
index.html.
388. Id.
389. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 327 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
390. Florida's Death Penalty Unconstitutional, A PUB. DEFENDER, June 22, 2011, http://a
publicdefender.com/2011/06/22/floridas-death-penalty-is-unconstitutional/.
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